Strengthening Federalism Through Charter Decisions
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is seen by many to be a major victory for individual liberty. The Charter is seen as a ground-breaking provision, but it is also at the mercy of interpretation. Like the Constitution containing it, there are many ambiguous terms which inevitably demand application when settling disputes between two parties. This requirement of interpretation can turn the Charter from celebrated to controversial depending on the interests involved. In Canada, provincial and federal legislatures are most often in charge of interpreting the Constitution favourably by creating laws that capture the spirit of the document. If for some reason there is concern with how the Constitution, and Charter, is interpreted through this legislation, the Supreme Court of Canada is the final decision-maker on its validity. This judicial review is the source of much debate, for a couple reasons. (Hiebert 2002: 21) .
It is important to note that the Supreme Court is not simply powerhungry, snatching away the balance of power away from the legislatures.
Rather, it seems that the nature of our system has fed into this shift. As F.L.
Morton argues, it is often a better move politically for governments to defer difficult rights questions to the Court. In remaining as neutral as possible, they avoid developing rifts within their party, as well as their constituencies (Morton 1999: 26) .
Since the Court has been given the final decision anyway, legislatures are able to save face while still getting some kind of results for their region.
Legislatures seem to have accepted that instead of a dialogue with the Court, there is instead a monologue or a chain of command with the judiciary at the top giving orders (Morton 1999 ).
The Canadian system was certainly not intended to have this top-down approach. Sir John A.
MacDonald thought that the division of power in this country would be clearly laid out so that judicial review of federal-provincial disputes would be unnecessary (Manfredi 2001: 12) . The Notwithstanding Clause, which will be discussed later, was also supposed to even the playing field so that the As Jennifer Smith points out, the provinces were mostly cold to the idea of the Charter because it was seen as a limit on their autonomy.
The main source of this negativity stems from the fact that Supreme Court Justices are appointed by the federal government. Opponents to this view argue that judicial decisions apply to the federal level as much as the provincial, and that the judiciary is its own independent body, and therefore free from potentially biasing influences (Smith 2004: 61) . While it is easy to understand the counterpoint to the provincial concerns, it is hard to buy into its real world implications. This is not to say that it is certain the Supreme Court would be biased toward the federal government, since that is how they are appointed.
However, it is only natural, in our democratic country, to be sceptical about any appointed officials even if they are appointed to the highest Court in the land. It would be nice to think that the Supreme Court is an independent body, free from any sort of political influence, and it certainly is possible. The trouble is that there are also going to be questions raised about the legitimacy of an appointed body, and those questions are being raised here by the provincial legislatures.
Not only is there concern of bias toward the federal government, but the Charter is also seen by some as a way of centralizing public policy. By concentrating so much power into the Supreme Court, it appears as though the Charter becomes pan-Canadian.
Since one centralized body is responsible for dealing with Charter disputes across the country, there is bound to be a certain amount of conformity to specific values that the Court applies in their cases. This is not really a fault of the Court. With the same people presiding over all cases it is only natural for their personal moral standards to be an influence in their decisions. This is also precisely the reason why the power dynamic for Charter conflicts needs to be adjusted. Allowing the Supreme Court the ability to deliberate and issue a verdict is useful, but they may not be as aware (Morton 1999: 24-25 is the judiciary which is actually the most powerful by way of its responsibility for such enforcement (Manfredi 2001: 22) . This implies that it is the Supreme Court who must ultimately be pleased, rather than the provisions of the Charter. There is no problem with the judiciary being able to review legislation, but rather the way the system allows the The main question that needs to be answered is why did the Notwithstanding Clause fall into disfavour? We would be best served by looking at the most famous instance of when it was enacted.
Since it is enacted so rarely, and has been the centre of major controversy, it seems that past experience is a main reason to steer clear of the clause.
In the 1988 case Ford v. (Manfredi 2001: 195) . Another thing that needs to be addressed is the finality that Supreme Court decisions entail. This is troubling because it assumes that the Supreme Court is the final word on Charter interpretation, and that they cannot be swayed by certain biases or partiality. This finality can be hard to swallow given that the judges are appointed rather than elected by those whom they are ruling over.
Furthermore, as Leeson states, since judges are going to be of a certain type -well-educated, elite in some sense (at least academically), it may be argued that they do not properly represent the general population (Leeson 2000: 3 
